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WORK INCENTIVE POLICIES:
AN EVALUATION OF THEIR EFFECTS
ON WELFARE WOMEN'S CHOICE
Jacqueline Ballou
Boston College
Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare
43 Hawkins Street, Boston

I.

LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF AFDC MOTHERS

Much rhetoric has been heard in recent years on the subject of getting AFDC mothers "off the welfare rolls and onto payrolls." The focus
of many a federally funded study is still on those personal life characteristics such as "motivation" which are supposed to facilitate the
actual leaving off of welfare checks. Indeed, much national policy
effort has been aimed at improving work incentives and providing supportive services (training, job placement, day dare) for those on AFDC.
However, in spite of the efforts of the Work Incentive Program (WIN)
only 16 percent of AFDC mothers were working in 1973 (USDHEW, 1974).
The focus of this evaluation, therefore, is to explore those mandatory
work incentive policies and choices that confront the AFDC mother as
well as explore those specific barriers to labor market success confronting these heads of households, by way of evaluating the WIN program.
The problem ultimately lies in the structure of the labor market
and in social attitudes about women's position in society, which affect
the AFDC mother. It has been said that the traditional women's "role"
though historically a crucial but economically unrewarding one has contributed directly to the present welfare crisis. The work ethic in our
society still dictates that women are not expected to seek employment
except under special circumstances, as when they become household heads,
while at the same time our norms also dictate that they work at unpaid
labor at home, and perhaps work harder, all told, than men.
It is argued here that Work Incentive Policies treat the symptoms
rather than the basic causes of poverty with high costs to society. The
writer's own experience with WIN participants as well as attitudinal
surveys has suggested that there is a very high motivation to work among
welfare mothers, however, the low-wage jobs available to them are not
very competitive with benefits available through AFDC with its various
in-kind programs such as Medicaid and day care. As Sawhill (1976) notes,
the combined benefit-loss rates associated with work incentive programs
remain high, as budgetary constraints associated with raising net welfare-wage incentives and services remain high along with administrative
costs of a work incentive program. However acceptable the concept of
work incentives and however great the effort, the shift from dependency
to self-support for these three-and-a-half-million women and their children is extremely difficult to bring about.
It is well known that almost half of all female-headed families with
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children are poor, and a similar proportion are on welfare comprising
97 percent of the adult AFDC caseload (1971 HEW AFDC Study). The concept of work for AFDC mothers seems to many to be an acceptable answer
to the "welfare crisis" because of changing attitudes about the economic
dependency of women when almost one-third of wives with husband present
and children under age six are working today compared to less than one

fifth a decade ago.
However, it is less well known that women on welfare already have
a substantial work history even while on aid. Public assistance can be
shown to be a form of wage supplementation to the low paid, partially
employed workers (Rein & Miller, 1968). Welfare status does not repSchiller
resent a sharp break with employment as is commonly supposed.
(1973) quotes studies having shown that the median time on welfare is
only 20 months, and approximately one-fourth of current recipients are
in

the labor force.

There are high rates of mobility between welfare

and work status. Like other American women, most welfare mothers have
Data from the 1969 HEW study
worked for wages at one time or another.
showed that before going on welfare, over three-quarters had worked at
some time. Exactly how many now combine work and welfare during the
course of a year is not known but there are large regional variations
due to varying state wage rates and grant allowances. Data from preWIN studies pointed to around 30 percent nationwide (Coll, 1974).
II.

There is

WORK INCENTIVE POLICIES:
PROGRAM GOALS AND RESULTS

an assumption, however,

by top policy-makers in

Washington

(especially in an election year) that the problem of employment for AFDC
recipients is merely a choice between work or welfare. The thrust of
government policy is now explicitly (as currently presented in TV spot
ads for WIN) and some would say coercively directed at checking the
rapid growth of welfare expenditures by funneling AFDC recipients into
the labor force through the Work Incentive Program. The Talmadge Amendments which further reinforced the 1967 Social Security Amendments which
conditioned welfare benefits on the willingness of the poor to accept
work or training, are based on the premise that poor people must be
forced to work. To make working worthwhile, however, states are, since
1971, required to allow the employed welfare recipient to keep $30.00
plus one-third of monthly earnings before recalculating the assistance
This "earnings exemption" or "earnings disregard" is deemed
payment.
essential in encouraging recipients to work rather than welfare because
many states had heretofore deducted the full amount of earnings from the
The practice of allowing certain expenses related
assistance payment.
to work or training, such as transportation and equipment, to $60.00 a
to be assured as is day care for preschool age children
month is still
and suitable arrangements for after school hours for other youngsters.
Training, either institutional or on-the-job, was to be given those
women who lacked immediate placement in employment. These aspects of
the WIN I program are still in effect and came into full operation in
July of 1969, but were replaced by a revised program - WIN II - on
July 1, 1972.
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The results of WIN I were disappointing in terms of numbers enIn the
rolled as well as numbers who completed training and/or got jobs.
3 1/2 years of WIN I, about 10 percent of the adult caseload were enrolled and only 3 percent had been placed in employment by April 1972.
Slightly more than half of those enrolled had dropped out, many of them
for "good cause" such as illness, pregnancy, or need to care for family
Job opportunities for women were mainly confined to
(Coll, 1974).
clerical and sales work or service occupations where the pay was low
Only one out of five completed
(averaging $1.92 to $2.55 per hour).
the course of training according to 1971 reports before the Talmadge
Amendments. In urging changes in the WIN program, Congress called attention to the difficulty of defining the term "appropriate" referral to
WIN, and criticized the extensive rise of institutional training, which
had apparently been given "without due regard to existing skill demands."
Therefore, all able-bodied AFDC recipients were required to register as
a condition of eligibility with two important differences; WIN II specifically exempted women caretakers of children under 6, although these
women were free to volunteer for the program. WIN II also exempted
women caretakers if the father or other male relative was in the home
and eligible for participation. Furthermore, the highest priority was
to be given to unemployed fathers; then to volunteer mothers; third,
other mothers and pregnant women under age 19; fourth, nonexempt dependent children and relatives (over age 16 and not in school); and fifth,
all others. Direct placement in jobs was preferred to training and employers were allowed tax credits for hiring WIN participants. An expanded on-the-job training program with federal reimbursements was developed, which was largely confined to men because of the reluctance of
employers to hire women for jobs suited to such training and public
service employment (Coll, 1974).
Results of WIN II are not very different from WIN I, in spite of
the substantially higher program participation and administrative
Evidence that the entire work training program may be fundamencosts.
tally flawed is strengthed by the fact that 80 percent of those who in
1973 entered WIN failed to obtain jobs and the average wage of those
Furthermore, only 12 percent
who did was $2.00 per hour (Goodwin, 1973).
of the adult caseload was enrolled in 1974 and of those, only 4 percent
were placed on jobs. More than a third of those dropped out and returned to welfare because a change in their situations had made them
the program and the welexempt.
But a large number, almost half, left
fare rolls for reasons not direclty connected to WIN, such as return of
spouse or receipt of other benefits.
As would be expected, however, women were not nearly as successful
as men in working their way off welfare. With a WIN participation rate
of 70 percent of women, only 41 percent completing job entry became independent of welfare compared to 59 percent of men completing job entry
But the entry hourly wage for
(held a job for 90 days after placement).
Probably the
all jobs for women was $1.87; for men, $2.58 (Coll, 1974).
HEW regulation requiring men who work more than 100 hours to be dropped
from the rolls without the earnings disregard that is allowed women
caused a higher rate of their being taken off aid.
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III.
is
of
of
in

RELATION OF BENEFIT LEVELS TO WAGES

One seeming paradox of the program that should not be surprising
that the earnings disregard has, in fact, tended to reduce the number
women terminated from AFDC because of employment. The economic facts
a higher working income allowed before welfare grant reduction has,
some states, gone quite high before the welfare break-off point.

It is an important fact that welfare benefits have risen not only
absolutely but in relation to income from work as part of a policy to
increase work incentives. Durbin, in a New York City study (1968), discovered that in the 1960's welfare benefits increased more than the minimum wage and more than the average or maximum unemployment compensation
benefits. She emphasized that benefits-in-kind such as medical services
also determine real welfare income to the recipient.
A recent New York City study (Shkuda, 1976) showed evidence that
economic insecurity in the low-wage high-turnover sector contributed to
a more favorable view of welfare with one-third of the sample returning
to aid after 6 months of independence. The relationship of specific
welfare benefit levels to wages as a determinant of the work-welfare
choice has not yet received all the attention it deserves in the seventies. There has been no conclusive research on the phenomenon as to
why a small group of AFDC clients go on and off welfare periodically
due to reasons of employment, and therefore only tentative hypotheses
can be generated from the studies of the work efforts of recipients who
were unsuccessful over a long time period (Lowenthal, 1971). Data also
indicate that there is a small group of "stable" AFDC clients who use
welfare in a continuous way, and a much larger group that rotates between being on and off welfare (Rein and Wishnov, 1971). Opton, in a
1971 study, for example, found that most of the jobs held by his sample
of AFDC women lasted only a short time, with the modal length being
three months.
He points out that if an AFDC mother is to become selfsupporting through her own earnings, she would need to find a job that
would pay enough not only to make her ineligible for welfare, but
enough to enable her to accumulate enough savings to carry her through
unemployment, a very difficult task. What ultimately emerges is a
picture of long association with the labor market, but employment periods of short duration or intermittent labor.
All of the studies cited previously are markedly consistent and
imply that the assumption that welfare recipients require extraordinary
world-of-work orientation or other forms of motivation stimulus is not
The fact that millions of poor families continue to work
well founded.
without the security of welfare is itself significant evidence of a committment to work. Comparative studies of employed and nonemployed poor
indicate that these groups share virtually identical aspirations and
attitudes (Schiller, 1973). Indeed some studies cited by Schiller,
Goodwin, and others have even suggested that the poor have a stronger
commitment to work than the nonpoor, implying that the motivation issue
is a "middle class conceit."
Other important elements in the "choice" of work or welfare have
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been overlooked by the present WIN program. So far, policy-making
appears to have proceeded on the assumption that it could ignore the
needs and experience of the target population with questionable results
in terms of program effectiveness. These elements will be examined here.
IV.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE WORK OR WELFARE "CHOICE"

Much of the research done on aspects of the work-welfare choice
has treated only one aspect of the work-welfare issue - whether it be
the relationship of wages to welfare benefits, examinations of the work
characteristics and limitations of the ability of women in general to
enter the labor force, or subcultural influences. Many of these studies
have ignored the specific problems of AFDC heads of households and have
instead assumed an unlimited "supply" side of the labor market, which
ignores the "demand" for labor in economic terms.
It is proposed here
that any policy reevaluation of the WIN program with the goals of stimulating recipient motivation and also eliminating major barriers that
AFDC women have in moving from welfare to self-support should be analyzed
in terms of 1) the health of the AFDC population, 2) the role conflict
of the maternal ethic vs. the work ethic of a mother without a husband,
3) adequacy of child care facilities, 4) the effects of past experience
with WIN and the low-wage job market and training, 5) higher work and
home related expenses of a mother with no "wife" at home, 6) general
ignorance about work incentives in welfare budgets, 7) the human capital
or labor characteristics of AFDC women, 8) the labor market environment
and characteristics such as race and sex discrimination, and 9) availability of jobs and wage levels. It will be seen here that the present
WIN program does not take each of these factors into consideration as
determining the probability of self support. Each of these factors will
be examined here.
(1) Health of AFDC Mothers. Serious barriers to the attainment
of self-support or even to working at all were identified in a study
conducted by SRS shortly after the inception of WIN (National Analysts, SRS, 1971). This study aimed to find out from the women themselves what their circumstances and intentions were in regard to working in ten cities. In view of their ages, a surprisingly large number
(44 percent) said they were unable to work because of illness, surgery,
accident, or physical disability. Although most were receiving medical
treatment, they expressed a great deal of pessimism about sufficient
recovery to take a job. Data from other studies tend to confirm the
presence of a high degree of serious chronic illness and impairments
among AFDC mothers: obesity, due to high starch diet; heart trouble;
arthritis; tuberculosis; female disorders; hypertension; and varicose
veins. Such ailments comprise "medical exemptions" for perhaps onethird of AFDC women because so many can qualify only for jobs requiring
physical exertion (Coll, 1974).
(2) Role conflict. In contrast to the maternal ethic which may
put any blame for juvenile delinquency on the mother who fails to provide her young children with proper attention, love, and guidance, the
work ethic of the welfare rules places emphasis on the financial responsibility of the woman if the father is absent or deserts (Bluestone and
Hardman, 1972).
That is, the woman is supposed to find employment to
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maintain herself and her children 6 years of age and over even when
they need after school and summer-time care, ideally reducing welfare
to a temporary stop-gap measure until self-supporting employment can be
found.
As more political sentiment in the seventies encourages healthy
welfare mothers with children under age 6 to enter the labor market,
the emphasis on the work ethic intensifies and the maternal ethic becomes more problematic. The more restrictive a woman's conception of
the maternal ethic or traditional family role, for example her decision
to be the sole or primary caretaker of her child until he enters first
grade--the greater the probability that she will choose to rely on AFDC.
Wishnov, in a 1971 Boston study, speculates that such women attach less
and less stigma to welfare since it is the sole vehicle which permits
her to stay at home at a time when the homemaker role has greater validity with no husband present. Wishnov's study also showed that even
among women who worked while on assistance, self-respect was more
closely linked to their home and family than a job. Their first concern
is their child's welfare, not work. This attitude is not peculiar to
welfare mothers either, it is shared by the general population.
(3) Adequacy of Child Care Facilities. The subject of child care
illustrates the complexities of policy decisions that must be made in
any removal of barriers to employment for welfare mothers.
The lack of
adequate child care facilities
has always been an important constraint
on labor force entry of women.
One cannot conclude, however, that the
guarantee of child care facilities
will significantly increase employment among welfare mothers. We are reminded that the "forced work"
ethic is not absolute, but provisional, no mother will be referred to
work unless child care is assured. Nationwide, there is a shortage of
day care facilities. Most working AFDC mothers in the 1971 study had
made their own arrangements with relatives or friends. Today, there
is less stigma attached to the use of day care centers. But even those
mothers who might prefer institutional care report that such facilities
are often too inflexible for employment demands, operating too few hours
and providing no care for children who are ill; the latter deficiency
has been cited as a major cause of mothers' absenteeism (Schiller, 1973).
Possible illnesses of the children, of the mother herself, or of the
adult who is caretaker in the home, special school holidays, or severe
weather conditions can disturb the mother's employment schedule. Many
employers are not aware of the single parents' responsibilities or
If the employer is aware, adjustments for time off
simply do not care.
or allowances for sick leave and emergencies are not always worked out
The mother does not always have relatives
in a "tight" job market.
It has been shown that
or friends who can assist during emergencies.
WIN program administration cannot always cover these contingencies
adequately and there are many job drop-outs due to these contingencies.
Just exactly how many is not known. These considerations suggest that
the employment impact of expanded day care facilities is likely to be
modest, and that compulsory child-care programs are apt to have a hostile reception (Schiller, 1973).
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(4) Effects of Past Experience with WIN and Jobs. It has been
found that one source of anxiety about work capability among welfare
women is past experience characterized by a series of low paying, high
turnover jobs (Wishnov, 1971). Even with a job, women who have been on
welfare may feel uncertain about their tenure or about the adequacy of
their salary to improve their standard of living. When women who have
been encouraged to complete a training program through WIN, for example,
fail
to obtain employment, they have definite and immediate experience
of failure in the work world and thereby become even more dependent on
welfare. Ninety-five percent of the unemployed WIN orientation and
training terminees were back on aid in 1972 (Goodwin, 1972) and the statistics
today are similar.
Along these lines it should be noted that
throughout the nation the demand for WIN skill training far exceeds
available training slots and available services, and many WIN referrals
are simply recycled time after time. In fact, recipients themselves
report in the mid-seventies that job search efforts yield little payoff
and that production cut-offs were a frequent cause of their welfare dependency in the first place. These phenomena, says Schiller and others,
not only renders mandatory participation rules meaningless but expresses
the desire of recipients to acquire skills and jobs. It is also known
that many of the most able and motivated program participants become
WIN dropouts who terminte their participation to take jobs.
(5) Higher Costs for a Mother with no "Wife" to do Housework. Surveys by the U.S. Department of Agriculture as reported by the Children's
Bureau as far back as 1966 indicate that, on the average, work-related
expenses can take one-third of a welfare mother's earnings if child care
is not paid for, and the amount increases to one-half where there are
school-age children. Today's WIN program pays for child care expenses
including transportation of the child, but it does not pay for costs for
additional clothing and personal care necessitated by employment, emergency (one time) transportation for medical and other needs, the costs
of meals away from home for the mother (except in certain training programs where transportation is also paid for), the cost of extra food at
home for the child-care person, if any, and above all,
extra costs for
cleaning, laundry, and other time-saving housekeeping devices needed by
the mother who is employed.
The mother, after a certain amount of time
of on-the-job training, must pay her own transportation costs which may
be high due to lack of inner-city public facilities
from crime-ridden
slum areas, or lack of rural transportation.
(6)
General Ignorance About Work Incentives in Welfare Budgets.
A pertinent aspect of the use of the aforementioned first thirty dollars
and a third of all wages per month income disregards for recipients is
the extent to which recipients know about them.
Solary concluded in a
1971 study that most respondents were unaware of even the most general
meaning of the disregards.
The complexity of the computations still
require a trained caseworker anyway.
Appel in a 1972 study revealed that
more than half of those in his Michigan sample who knew about these disregards stated that it had caused them to seek work or training.
But
most recipients still do not know at the time of WIN interviews whether
or by how much employment will raise their incomes.
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However, the earnings disregards should also make AFDC both available and attractive to working nonrecipient female heads of households
according to the desirability theory. Thus the net effect of earnings
disregards, says Rein (1973) is that they should be equally influential
in encouraging those not on welfare to stop work, avail themselves of
welfare and then go back to work. Another type of disregard that can
affect the pattern of work and welfare is called "casual or sporadic income," and is defined as any amount that is "not received continuously
or predicted over time such as seasonal (and holiday sales) employment.
A third route for income disregard is failure of the client to report
such seasonal or irregular income to the assistance payments worker for
budgeting.
(7) Human Capital or Labor Characteristics. The sprase evidence
on the human capital characteristics of welfare recipients indicates
that although they have a significant amount of job experience (noted
previously), they do have lower educational achievements than the average working woman in the economy. Rein (1972), for example, reviews
research dealing with social determinants of the work-welfare choice
which focuses on such human capital characteristics as education, employment history, and race. Recent studies report that more educated
AFDC mothers are more likely to work and are likely to work more than
those less educated, but there is no clear link between years of education and the occupational "success" of AFDC women (Goodman, 1969 and
Rien, 1972).
It is not well known that black AFDC recipients work more
than whites put Podell (1968) reports a positive relationship between
education and work history held for whites, but not for blacks. It is
known that age of recipient and number of children and their ages are
crucial to success or failure in working one's way off welfare, and the
WIN program does not directly address itself to these factors.
Finally, evidence is accumulating that for a broad range of occupations, institutional training or educational attainment is a poor predictor of job success or performance. Schiller quotes several studies
finding that the labor market payoff to vocational training or even several levels of educational attainment is negligible, especially for
minority group workers. Much job training must still be done on-site,
and many employers who do hire training program graduates are not aware
that such persons have received skill training.
(8) Labor Market Environment and Discrimination. The linear association between education, occupation, and work effort is disturbed in
the case of AFDC mothers by such factors as job discrimination, which
nullifies the effects of education on occupation, as well as cultural
patterns that lead to the prevalence of certain occupations rather than
mobility (Rein, 1973).
In addition to human capital it is racial and
sexual discrimination and the overall level of the economy and, more
recently, isolated cases of affirmative action suits that will determine
how well AFDC individuals will do in the labor market. In effect, race
and sex discrimination and high unemployment can make a highly motivated
and well-trained AFDC mother unemployable.
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(9) Availability of Jobs and Wage Levels. There has always been
an implicit assumption in those years when welfare reform has been fashionable that jobs exist for all recipients who are ready and able to
seek them. Many features of the WIN program are intimately linked to
the supposition that ample job opportunities exist for welfare dependents, but empirical studies suggest that there is a tremendous gap
between public expectations and labor market realities (Schiller, 1973).
There is indirect evidence of job shortages in both WIN program statistics, year after year, and in national labor market trends. Many
analysts have noted that participation in WIN appears to be conditioned
by the availability of jobs, with WIN functioning as an alternative to
regular employment. It is a fact that when jobs are available, trainees
leave the program to take them. It seems preposterous to assume that
job vacancies exist in abundance for welfare women with over 6 million
or more people unemployed in the labor market. Even if some vacancies
did appear, the competition from more advantaged workers would, under
these labor market conditions, be intense, indeed. The tax credits
made available to employers of WIN graduates cited previously has not
had as much success as anticipated due to the fact, it is said, that
during a tight labor market there is little employer interest in such a
program, as few employers nationwide know about the credit or hire
enough WIN graduates to justify the cost of processing necessary tax
data.
Furthermore, with few exceptions the jobs held by AFDC mothers are
at the bottom of the economic ladder. A high percentage nationwide are
service workers - many of these in household service. About one-third
have clerical jobs or are doing light factory work. A few are saleswomen. Only a small percentage are in the better paid professional,
technical or kindred occupations (Coll, 1974).
The wage rates of these
high-turnover jobs were not sufficient to pay job expenses or get even
four percent of the adult caseload off the rolls in 1974. Unfortunately,
there is no basis for identifying financial security with the kinds of
jobs available to AFDC women. The problem is compounded by frequent
layoffs and as a result, annual earnings are significantly less than
implied by hourly wage data. Almost no one is "making it."
So the
situation is serious and the explanations "are much more likely to lie
in the structure of the job market than in individual assets and liabilities" (Opton, 1971).
It appears that the relative position of AFDC women in the labor
force has actually deteriorated in recent years. What is most disturbing about this situation is that when white women do find full time work,
their wage income is normally less than two-thirds that of white men,
and many surveys have shown that black women fare much worse, earning
only half as much as their white male counterparts. Differences in education between the sexes cannot explain these large wage differentials.
This deterioration can be traced to the growing labor force participation of women's influx into the traditional "female" sector of the economy and to the evolving stratification of the labor market. Any increase
in the labor force participation rates has occurred mainly among white
women because black women have always had much higher participation
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Finally, since AFDC women are
rates (Davidson and Gaitz, 1974).
"crowded" into a smaller set of specific occupations, they are likely
to depress wages further. Thus, we may be led to the conclusion that
the foregoing employment barriers operate on a cumulative effect. Some
of them can be coped with, but as their numbers increase, so does unemIt should not be surprising to
ployment (Levinson, 1970; Shea, 1973).
note that based on the analysis of the factors relating to the workwelfare choice, Bluestone and Hardman state that
to reach a 15 percent labor force participation rate among
AFDC recipients would require, for example, that in addition to the 13.3 percent of adult AFDC women already employed, all unskilled AFDC women be trained and look for
work, and that somewhat more than one-half of those who are
needed in the home.. .be provided with services... to allow
their participation in the paid labor force... and overcome
the circumstances associated with their initial entry into
(1972, p. 6)
assistance.
Their maximum potential labor force participation rate is therefore
It is also clear by HEW
approximately 32 percent or one-third (p. 6).
(1970) that unless hourly earnings are sufficiently high and work is
full year and full-time, total welfare costs will fall only slightly.
It is obvious that employment of AFDC household heads has not resulted
in substantial financial gains to either client or taxpayers, and since
a large percentage of WIN recipients never become employed, the average
financial gain to clients and taxpayers of each referral to WIN is much
lower than the average for those who receive services and actually become employed at their own request (Fine, 1972; Auerbach Associates,
Yet 1972 regulations extending the WIN program re1972; Breul, 1973).
quired that about 1.5 million welfare recipients "sign up" for work with
all the attendant administrative costs.
V.

WORK INCENTIVE POLICIES: RECOMMENDATIONS

If program retention and attendance reflect program affectiveness,
The experience of WIN does not justify the bethe test.
then WIN fails
that an expanded program will enable many welfare recipients to belief
come self-supporting. The design and implementation of WIN are both
based upon mistaken beliefs about the psychology of welfare recipients.
The results of a psychological study of poor people showed that their
orientation toward money indicates uncertainty about achieving success
Long term welrather than denial of self-development (Goodwin, 1972).
An infrequently considered
fare women lack confidence in their ability.
consequence of WIN's failure to deliver jobs is the frustration of the
women's own aspirations because most of them have been shown to view WIN
as an opportunity for self-advancement and a way to raise family income
Instead, the WIN orientation component is de(Reid and Smith, 1972).
signed to introduce recipients into the world of work and to stimulate
work motivation they allegedly lack (Gold, 1971).
Should the assumption of recipient lack of motivation be proven
wrong, then it is obvious that such compulsory workfare requirements
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will waste scarce administrative resources, impose unnecessary hardship
on recipients, and further increase taxpayer and recipient hostility.
But today's taxpayers misguidedly seem to be clamoring for a program
that, upon closer examination, seems to hamper efficient administration
and costs more than it saves by complicated financial arrangements that
few persons thoroughly understand, limited subsidies to cooperating employers, and wide differences from state to state (Lowenthal, 1971;
Levitan, 1973).
There is little point in requiring attendance in such
a weak program, and the resources used in keeping track of attendance
and counselling absentees could be restructured to increase program
effectiveness (Levitan, 1972), especially when training funds have been
drastically cut back in these years of 1975-76 due to their not conforming to local labor market-conditions irrelevant to job success. Much
more serious attention should be given to the potential for job development and job creation instead of assuming a massive availability of jobs
(Schiller, 1973).
The structure of the occupational system, the operation of labor
markets, the levels of wages and taxes require intervention. Any effort
to incite AFDC mothers toward employment as sole breadwinners will have
to make provisions for regular and steady jobs paying enough to override
some of the benefits-in-kind of income maintenance, must deal with
mothers' flexibility to move between work and welfare due to child care
contingencies, must be better than the security of welfare payments, and
must be better than even the potential for incomplete disclosure of resources, as well as realizing the desirability of the minimal demands of
Successful welfare reform
irregular type jobs (Rein and Wishnov, 1971).
must provide for those who cannot manage themselves, give incentives to
those who can manage to contribute to their own success and at the same
time keep administrative costs acceptable (Levitan, 1973).
Efforts to eliminate poverty should also include incentives for a
husband and wife to stay together because of the importance of joint income. A more equitable distribution of the tax burden would probably
have greater economic effect than governmental training programs, because
work requirements make a large number of persons available for low-wage
Thus
and seasonal jobs, which tend to depress wages (Lowenthal, 1971).
the WIN program may be actually keeping wages non-competitive by work
requirements. Rein (1972), states that "A public policy intent on transforming the welfare system into a major instrument for reducing poverty
and also for self-liquidating welfare, by converting it into a manpower
program, is bound to rely upon coercion and to produce frustrating results."
As discussed earlier, there is no observable tendency for these
mothers to reject economic opportunities for the "comfort" of welfare
status. The writer has noted that confronted with few opportunities to
achieve upward mobility themselves, welfare mothers place added emphasis
on their children's future, expressing a strong desire for both financial and social service assistance in preparing their children for what
they hope will be a brighter future.
One of the principal recommendations of this paper is that manpower
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programs and public assistance programs be separated so that each may
fulfill its particular mission. If the opportunity to work is absent
or if the nature and circumstances of work is oppressive as in work requirements, severe repurcussions are likely to be experienced in family
life. A remarkable study which was commissioned by HEW the month when
the Talmadge Amendment was passed, entitled Work in America, argues that
one of the most satisfying and respected employments should be that of
housewife, and that every woman, including the public assistance reciient, should have the opportunity to choose between taking outside employment and "working" to care for her home and family. The task force
says that, "It is time to give full recognition to the fact keeping house
is work, and it is as difficult to do well (and is as useful to the
larger society) as paid jobs producing goods and services. Counting
housewives in the labor force would be a useful step in redefining a
portion of our welfare problem, and constructing judicious alternatives."
Indeed, wages for family housework could go far toward solving the "welfare crisis," as so many European countries have already discovered.
The task force readily asserts that a particularly serious mistake
in social policy in the United States was made in the late '60's and
early '70's when there occurred the virtual amalgamation of manpower
and welfare programs. Breul (1973) notes that the task force recommends
that the role of public assistance should be limited to helping people
who "cannot take jobs, or by social agreement, should not take jobs."
Taking into consideration the effects of a high unemployment rate, the
report concludes that "a welfare program with a work requirement will
not help the mother, the children, or society at large."
The task
force emphasizes that work is the key to diminishing economic dependence,
of course, but it states that no one should be forced into employment.
Instead, everyone available for work should be guaranteed a satisfying
and adequately compensated job. This guarantee should include AFDC
mothers in their role as household heads who deserve adequate wages for
housework. For the immediate future, however, the male-female earnings
gap which is widening is one of the major barriers to large numbers of
AFDC women leaving the welfare rolls for payrolls. No amount of work
effort on the part of female heads of families will go very far in reducing their poverty and dependence on welfare as long as these women
face such low wages in the market.
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